Economists under Pressure and the Political Limits to Economics

Will Mechanism Design Set Us Free? Algorithmic Institutions and Hayekian Freedom

Leportier Kevin, University of Caen Normandie

Mechanism design refers to the design of rules and institutions that generate socially desirable outcomes from individual actions based on private information, while market design constitutes its concrete application to specific arrangements, such as auctions, matching procedures, or school choice systems. Within this framework, markets are understood in a broad sense, extending beyond conventional market exchange to encompass a wide range of economic and social allocation problems. This expansion has generated contrasting normative interpretations: some authors view these as "socialist mechanisms" (Lojkine, 2025) or a "third way" between market and state (Simioni and Steiner, 2024), while others defend a refoundation of capitalism through the generalization of auction mechanisms, as illustrated by Posner and Weyl’s (2018) provocative claim that “the auction will set you free.” This article argues that, beyond these competing interpretations, mechanism design raises a distinct question: under what conditions can designed institutions be compatible with a Hayekian conception of freedom? Mechanism design is associated with an engineering approach to economics (Roth), which raises questions about the normative criteria guiding institutional design and the ethics of economic engineering (Li, 2017). These concerns have spurred a growing literature on the normative foundations and implications of market design (Tideman, 2019; Hitzig, 2020; van Basshuysen, 2022). Li (2017), in particular, argues for a break with the preference utilitarianism underlying canonical results, such as the optimality of Gale–Shapley mechanisms (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). Pioneers of the field often invoke Hayek (1945) to justify their theoretical enterprise, specifically regarding the communication and use of dispersed information (Myerson, 2008; Maskin, 2015). This informational challenge is typically regarded as met through the concept of incentive compatibility, which incorporates incentives for the revelation of private information into the achievement of socially desirable outcomes. However, this focus on informational efficiency tends to obscure a second, equally central Hayekian challenge: whether institutions designed by economic engineers can, unlike the socialist planning institutions criticized by Hayek (1944), avoid imposing forms of coercion and preserve individual freedom. Drawing on the view that Hayekian freedom is neither purely instrumental nor strictly negative (Jones and Marciano, 2025), the article contends that freedom entails institutions that ensure a certain predictability of the consequences of individual action, which is a condition for learning, adaptation, and responsibility. From this perspective, algorithmic mechanisms that operate as "black boxes" risk undermining freedom by weakening the link between individual choice, foreseeable consequences, and responsibility.

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Keywords: Mechanism design; Market design; Freedom; Hayek; Institutional design; Algorithmic allocation

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