Inheritance Tax and Good Society: Luigi Einaudi’s Reinterpretation of the Rignano Scheme
Recent international reinterpretations of the Rignano scheme (Erreygers and Di Bartolomeo 2007), as well as earlier Italian debates, have not sufficiently appreciated the originality of Luigi Einaudi’s reflections on inheritance taxation and, in particular, on his late reinterpretation and normative justification of the Rignano scheme (Einaudi 1946a, 1946b, 1949). This paper aims to fill that gap. It argues that Einaudi’s reflections on inheritance taxation can be fully understood only within the broader horizon of his inquiry into the normative foundations of the good society and the emerging welfare state. More specifically, it shows how Einaudi seeks to articulate and balance four sets of values: first, the role of taxation as an essential element of the social compact and as the pivot of the circulation of social benefits, leading to an original reformulation of the benefit-received principle as generalized reciprocity rather than punitive or sacrificial extraction; second, the relation between oikos and polis, whereby inheritance taxation, in light of the Rignano scheme, must serve both familial and social ends; third, equality of starting points and the value of merit, understood as the duty to prove oneself worthy of what one inherits by putting it to good use for family and society; and fourth, the limitation of large concentrations of economic and political power, within a vision of the good society grounded in distributism and vertical and horizontal subsidiarity, and in this respect a European precursor to the ideal of property-owning democracy.
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Keywords: Inheritance tax; Luigi Einaudi; Rignano scheme; Good society; Distributism; Property owning democracy; Equality