Neutrality Under Pressure: Swiss–Soviet Trade and the Political Limits of Economic Rationality (1945–1991)
This paper explores the tension between economic rationality and political constraint through the case of Swiss-Soviet trade from 1945 to 1991. Switzerland, as a neutral yet deeply export-oriented small state, became a revealing laboratory for examining how neutrality functioned not as an absence of alignment, but as an actively negotiated mode of economic governance under Cold War pressures. Drawing on newly accessed archives from Swiss corporations (ABB/BBC Brown Boveri, Georg Ficher, Roche, etc.), the Swiss Federal Archives, and Soviet trade representations, the study reconstructs the long-term interaction between firms, government agencies, and Western export-control institutions such as the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). The argument is that Swiss neutrality, far from insulating economic actors from political tension, continuously exposed them to complex and shifting constraints. CoCom restrictions on the export of strategic and dual-use technologies forced both private firms and state officials to navigate a dense web of compliance, circumvention, and case-by-case negotiation. While official discourse emphasized the primacy of economic efficiency and technical merit, actual trade practices reveal how political credibility and risk management became decisive economic variables. The Swiss case demonstrates how neutrality could be transformed into a form of “political capital,” converting diplomatic ambiguity into commercial opportunity, yet always under the watchful eye of Western allies and Soviet partners alike. By combining archival evidence with theoretical insights from neo-institutional and historical political economy approaches, the paper conceptualizes Swiss–Soviet trade as a “bounded field of rationality,” where economic calculation operated within the limits set by ideological suspicion, alliance expectations, and evolving definitions of “strategic goods.” This framing contributes to broader debates on how economic decision-making is reshaped by geopolitical constraints, both during the Cold War and in contemporary sanction regimes. Ultimately, the study argues that the political limits of economics are not exceptional states of crisis, but enduring structural features of international exchange. The Swiss experience reveals how neutrality, often idealized as an ethical or diplomatic stance, functioned as an economic technology of governance, enabling trade across divides while reproducing the very hierarchies it sought to transcend. The paper thus reinterprets neutrality under pressure as both a survival strategy and a system of dependency, where small-state rationality was continually recalibrated in response to external enforcement regimes.
Area:
Keywords: Neutrality, Cold War, USSR, Export controls, Political economy
Please Login in order to download this file