Beyond Cognitive Software: Faculties, Skills, and Epistemic Dispositions in the Origins of Behavioral Economics
Some influential interpretations of cognitive biases in behavioral economics portray them as malfunctions of individual “cognitive software,” implicitly modeling agents as imperfect information processors (e.g. Herzog and Hertwig 2025). From this perspective, behavioral economics—particularly as presented in Nudge—is often taken to focus on flawed heuristics while neglecting individual competences and the development of agency (Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff 2017). This paper challenges that reading by returning to the original publications in which canonical cognitive biases were first identified. Focusing on the biases cited in Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), the paper undertakes a close textual analysis of their foundational articles and shows that early behavioral economics associated cognitive failures not only with heuristic reasoning, but also with a broader set of individual features, including limitations of cognitive faculties, deficits in skills, and stable epistemic dispositions. Rather than treating agents merely as faulty information processors, these texts repeatedly invoke failures of statistical competence, epistemic self-regulation, and socially mediated judgment. Drawing on virtue epistemology as a reconstructive framework, the paper proposes a taxonomy distinguishing biases of incompetence, intemperance, and conformism. Biases of incompetence arise from limited cognitive capacities or insufficiently developed reasoning skills, such as those involved in probabilistic judgment. Biases of intemperance reflect failures of epistemic self-regulation despite available competence, as illustrated by overconfidence, optimism, and present bias. Biases of conformism arise from socially mediated belief formation and deference, including herd behavior and availability cascades. The paper concludes that early behavioral economics did more than document systematic departures from rational choice theory. It implicitly relied on a broader and more differentiated conception of individual rationality, one in which faculties, skills, and epistemic dispositions jointly shape economic judgment and behavior. By recovering this richer psychological and epistemic landscape, the paper contributes to ongoing historical debates about the foundations of behavioral economics and the interpretation of its core concepts.
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Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Cognitive Biases, Epistemic Dispositions, Virtue Epistemology, Rationality
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