Shadow of Keynes and Galbraith cast on Colonial Bengal: The tragedy of the Bengal Famine of 1943
In the historiography of Bengal and India writ large, the Bengal Famine of 1943 has been described as a man-made catastrophe. Investigations into the causality of the famine that officially claimed approximately three million lives have never seemed to have disinterested historians, and ironically, economists. Since the publication of Amartya Sen’s monograph, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, in 1981—a book that gained enough influence to earn him a Nobel Prize in Economics—the Bengal Famine of 1943 has grown into a standard trope used to denounce the indifference of colonial rulers towards their native subjects. This paper argues for looking beyond the metropole-colony relationship and examining the economic formalisms that guided famine-containment policies of the imperial and provincial governments. Drawing on the archival holdings of the National Archives of India and the Bengal Provincial Legislature, this paper argues that, in an effort to restore the population's consumption levels, provincial legislators in Bengal and imperial bureaucrats were caught between the conflicting wartime economic doctrines of John Kenneth Galbraith and John Maynard Keynes. Two highly contradictory principles guiding price controls and public rationing, born on either side of the Atlantic, were intended to confront the realities of a fragile colonial economy, resulting in drastic interventionist policies in near-perfectly competitive rice markets that ran counter to the ideals of free trade, which had been championed for almost a century. The paper aims to show how interventionist policies of price control, in the absence of rationing, ended up disrupting the natural course of trade (not a supposed economic anomaly) by creating black markets in regions with high purchasing power, something that absorbed rice supplies like a sponge to leave entire swathes of the rice-producing countryside without adequate supplies. The purpose of the paper alludes to the enduring question born of the polemical salvos fired by Gustav Schmoller at Carl Menger’s methodenstreit—can and should economic theories have universal applicability, or should economic theories be shaped by the historical contingencies at hand? Guided by this question, this paper presents an empirical case study on the limits of the universality of economic formalisms, something that confounded the relevant historical actors.
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Keywords: free trade, price controls, public rationing, Keynes, Galbraith, wartime economics, second world war
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