Economists under Pressure and the Political Limits to Economics

Monetary Disorder, War, and Economic Expertise in Ukraine, 1917-1918

Lopukh Kseniia, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

During the First World War, Ukraine experienced an exceptional convergence of monetary disorder, political fragmentation, and military pressure. The collapse of imperial monetary systems coincided with revolutionary upheaval, the emergence of fragile Ukrainian state institutions, and the presence of competing military and political authorities. Between 1917 and 1918, the Ukrainian economy operated in an environment characterized by multiple currencies in circulation, acute inflation, fragmented fiscal control, and unresolved questions of sovereignty. Monetary outcomes during this period were shaped more by political authority, military imperatives, and severe institutional constraints than by coherent economic design. This paper examines the limits of economic expertise under such conditions by reconstructing the monetary environment of Ukraine in 1917-1918 and analyzing the responses of economists operating within and in relation to this context. It explores how monetary disorder constrained both practical reforms and economic reasoning. Particular attention is paid to the simultaneous circulation of the Russian ruble, Austro-Hungarian krone, karbovanets, and hryvnia, as well as to repeated attempts to regulate currency inflows, stabilize exchange rates, and establish a national monetary system under conditions of war and administrative fragility. The paper adopts a comparative perspective by comparing the analyses and practical engagements of Ludwig von Mises and Ukrainian economists, particularly Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi. While Mises approached Ukraine as an external expert assessing monetary and financial strategies within a wartime and occupation-related framework, Ukrainian economists confronted similar problems from within the process of state-building. Their respective analyses of paper money, gold backing, functional theories of money, and fiscal capacity reveal both convergences and tensions in economic reasoning shaped by differing institutional positions and political constraints. Through this comparative analysis, the paper shows that economic expertise in Ukraine during 1917-1918 was systematically subordinated to political and military considerations. Monetary stabilization presupposed institutional coherence, fiscal discipline, and political legitimacy – conditions largely absent at the time. The Ukrainian case thus illustrates how economists operating in contexts of war and state fragility were compelled to adapt their analytical frameworks to non-economic constraints, and how direct encounters with monetary disorder influenced broader reflections on inflation, currency competition, and the institutional foundations of monetary order.

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Keywords: War economy, monetary instability, Ukraine in 1917-1918, history of economic thought, Ludwig von Mises, Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovskyi

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