Economists under Pressure and the Political Limits to Economics

The Postwar Revival of Monetary Policy

Carret Vincent, Seton Hall University

This paper challenges the conventional narrative that postwar American macroeconomic policy was dominated by a Keynesian consensus from 1945 until its overthrow by monetarists in the 1970s. Examining the period 1946-1953, particularly the debates surrounding the Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951, this study reveals significant theoretical and policy contestation that has been systematically overlooked in standard historiography. The paper demonstrates that prominent American Keynesians including Alvin Hansen, Paul Samuelson, and Abba Lerner advanced an extreme position regarding monetary policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s. They argued that: (1) monetary factors played no causal role in business fluctuations and therefore could not serve as effective stabilization tools; (2) interest rate changes were either ineffective in influencing investment and consumption or dangerously destabilizing; and (3) fiscal policy combined with direct price controls should be the primary instruments of macroeconomic management. This position left them unable to adequately address the inflation episodes of 1946-1948 and 1950-1951. Against this position, a diverse coalition emerged to revive monetary policy as a crucial instrument of economic stabilization. This coalition included Federal Reserve officials like Marriner Eccles and Allan Sproul, academic economists such as Clark Warburton, George Leland Bach and Lester Chandler, and public intellectuals like Henry Hazlitt. Drawing on quantity theory reasoning, these economists argued that postwar inflation resulted from monetary expansion facilitated by the Federal Reserve's cheap money policy and its obligation to support government bond prices. They emphasized that monetary policy could work through expectations and credit availability channels beyond simple interest rate effects. The 1949 Douglas Committee hearings provided a crucial public forum for these debates, but it was the Korean War inflation of 1950-1951 that served as a catalyzing event that made the position of American Keynesians increasingly untenable. The Fed-Treasury Accord of March 1951, which freed the Federal Reserve from supporting government bond prices, represented not merely an institutional change but the triumph of quantity theory perspectives over the dismissal of monetary policy by American Keynesians. This early "monetarist" victory influenced the Eisenhower administration's economic policy, which prioritized price stability through restrictive monetary policy and rejected direct controls on ethical grounds. The subsequent decade's anti-inflationary stance, rather than representing a Keynesian consensus, reflected the successful displacement of the prescriptions of American Keynesians by monetary policy advocates. This reassessment suggests that the monetarist revolution of the 1970s had deeper intellectual roots than commonly acknowledged, and that the postwar period featured vigorous theoretical contestation rather than paradigmatic consensus. The paper calls for further study of overlooked figures like Chandler, Bach, Warburton, and Goldenweiser, whose contributions to monetary theory and policy have been marginalized in histories that privilege the Keynesian narrative.

Area:

Keywords: monetary policy, American Keynesianism, monetarism, Federal Reserve