Beyond Expected Utility: The Economy as a Game and the Standards of Behavior
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), authored by mathematician John von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern, is best remembered for its formal apparatus and for the postwar diffusion of expected utility as a general principle of individual rationality. In contrast, the book’s extensive treatment of cooperative games has often been regarded as marginal, vague, or analytically unproductive. This article revisits that dimension, focusing on the informal rules underlying cooperative games, what the authors called “standards of behavior.” It argues that these quasi-anthropological rules performed both constitutive and regulative functions at topical, methodological, and epistemological levels. They provided heuristic accounts of informational, competitive, cooperative, and discriminatory dynamics, framing coalition formation as a social and political process through which individual and collective rationalities were jointly articulated. By systematically alternating between formal mathematical rules and informal norms, the book advanced a unified framework for rational behavior in liberal democracies. The article examines what these standards of behavior were traces of, analyzing the collaboration between von Neumann and Morgenstern. It contends that the concept arose primarily from von Neumann’s contribution, which both encompassed and exceeded Morgenstern’s ideas on ethics and subjective rules of rationality. Given von Neumann’s lifelong engagement with economics and the social sciences, the article foregrounds the institutional and intellectual milieu of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton as a key site where ideas about rules across different domains, those pragmatically encompassed by the standards of behavior, were discussed and made operative in cross-disciplinary contexts. More broadly, the article situates Theory of Games at the intersection of mid-twentieth-century debates in the social sciences, political thought, and the humanities, reconstructing these discussions in detail and showing how, according to some of the actors of this account, mathematics and the humanities could be articulated as distinct yet epistemologically interrelated practices.
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Keywords: Games, axiomatics and heuristics, information, competition, cooperation, discrimination