Rolling the Dice: Performativity and Its Limits in Integrated Assessment Models
At the end of the 2010s, following the Stern-Nordhaus controversy, the Interagency Working Group concluded to a social cost of carbon (SCC) of $21/tCO2 for US regulation policies in 2009- 20010, based on the PAGE, DICE and FUND models, on the very edge of the DICE’s conclusion. Can any inference be drawn between the two? A recent growing body of literature has argued that Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs henceforth) were performative (?Beck and Mahony, 2018; van Beek et al., 2020; Braunreiter et al., 2021; van Beek et al., 2022), as was discounting more broadly (Doganova, 2024). The notion of performativity of economic models may be quickly defined as when a specific economic model shapes the world it intends to describe (Mackenzie, 2006). In the context of IAMs, models such as DICE, would be performative insofar as they would act as policy advisory tools used to enable the mitigation policies they aim to simulate. By clarifying the limits of performativity, this paper seeks to refine its application to IAMs. While such models may frame the lines of academic and public debates, they do not determin- istically bring about the mitigation policies they represent. In this sense, there is no ‘Austinian’ performativity in discounting (Austin, 1962). Rather, their influence lies more in shaping the objects of discussion, such as the cost-benefit analysis or the Ramsey formula. IAMs can, thus, be understood as instances of negotiation among actors (researchers, policy experts, decision- makers...). However, their high level of complexity tends to detach them from explicit democratic scrutiny. On this basis, I analyse two contrasting cases: the RAINS model in late 20th-century acid rain regulation (Hordijk, 1991, 1995), often presented as a success of a performative model-based policymaking (van Beek et al., 2020), and the DICE model in climate economics (Nordhaus, 1992, 2007; Barrage and Nordhaus, 2024), one of the most widely used IAMs. I argue that, in both cases, claims of performativity are underdetermined: policy outcomes cannot be straightforwardly 1 attributed to models, even where their influence is widely acknowledged. Nonetheless, despite their popularity and widespread use by policy experts and decision mak- ers, climate economists often deny any sort of epistemic responsibility in their modelling practices (Gollier, 2019, p.21). The concept of epistemic responsibility has largely gone unquestioned in climate economics literature, and becomes even more pertinent in light of the so-called performa- tivity of IAMs: if the model can implement the mitigation scenario they aim to simulate, why wouldn’t there be any sort of responsibility from the scientist producing such a model? I distin- guish epistemic responsibility from scientific legitimacy. I understand the former as a normative criterion, i.e., blame or praiseworthiness of the methodological criteria scientists use to support their results in spite of any institutional recognition. Scientific legitimacy, on the other hand, is informed by such a recognition (Pindyck, 2017). Questioning the epistemic responsibility of a climate economist comes down to questioning their modelling practices, as well as their justifica- tions, some of which can be blameworthy from a normative perspective, yet get strong political and institutional recognition and legitimacy. The paper’s central aim is therefore to examine the limits of performativity, by highlighting this discrepancy: although IAMs benefit from considerable political and institutional support, they leave a normative blind spot in modelling practices.
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Keywords: Discounting; Integrated Assessment Models; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Performativity of Economics
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