Economists under Pressure and the Political Limits to Economics

Marc Fleurbaey's contributions to responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism

Audureau Julie, BETA, University of Strasbourg

In 2020, Marc Fleurbaey explicitly rejects personal responsibility as a justificatory principle for distributive inequalities, arguing that it is a ''distraction from major social issues'' and risks legitimizing ethically problematic distinctions between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor. At first glance, this appears to depart from his mid-1990s work, which formalized responsibility within egalitarian theories. Does this shift mark a rupture, or the culmination of a long-standing critical engagement with responsibility? This paper argues that Fleurbaey’s rejection does not constitute a reversal but the logical conclusion of a research program critical of responsibility from the outset. From his earliest writings, he exposes its conceptual, economic, and normative limitations, progressively narrowing its scope until its justificatory role is abandoned. Fleurbaey’s early critique of factor-selective egalitarianism (1995a, 1995b), in dialogue with Rawls (1971, 1982), Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), and later Cohen (1989), Arneson (1989, 1990), and Roemer (1993), identifies a core difficulty: compensating for circumstances conflicts with rewarding responsibility when effort and talent are non-additively separable in the individuals’ outcomes function. Policies aimed at neutralizing circumstances inevitably interfere with neutrality regarding effort. Rather than abandoning the egalitarian project, Fleurbaey proposes outcome-selective egalitarianism, evaluating justice ex post once individual choices are observed. This prioritizes compensation (“equal outcomes for equal responsibility”) over reward (“equal transfer for equal talents”) and critiques ex ante approaches, including Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance model, for relying on impoverished information. This line of critique is persistent in Fleurbaey’s work, exemplified by the figure of the “serial squanderer,” who repeatedly dissipates opportunities but whose treatment exposes the fragility of responsibility-centred egalitarianism on individual life paths leading to ‘’harsh conclusions’’ (Anderson 1999). He later addresses interpersonal comparisons and Arrow’s impossibility theorem through egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler), enabling ordinal comparisons without cardinal utilities. Responsibility becomes residual, concerning individuals’ satisfaction rather than foundational desert, a notion he terms “liability for preferences”. From 1995a onward, he detaches responsibility from metaphysical notions of control, framing it as ‘’socially delegated’’: collective decisions define “social outcomes” and leave “private outcomes,” including subjective satisfaction, to individual discretion (1995a). This undermines the core normative claim of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. Detached from control, desert, or merit, responsibility loses its moral force and in later formulations, “equality of autonomy” (2008) and “equality of dignity” (2020), remains at the margins of his distributive justice theory. From this perspective, the 2020 rejection consolidates a long-term trajectory: ex post evaluation, outcome-selective egalitarianism, delegated responsibility, and egalitarian-equivalence (2003, 2008) gradually erode responsibility’s role. What remains is an egalitarian framework prioritizing a robust social foundation and the prevention of socially produced disadvantage rather than sorting individuals by choices. Situating Fleurbaey within responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, this paper interprets his work as a sustained effort to transcend that tradition from within. The evolution from equality of “social outcomes” (1995), to “autonomy” (2008), and finally “dignity” (2020) marks a shift away from responsibility as a basis for justice but we still manage to classify Fleurbaey’s theory within his predecessors with the ''justice cut'' and ''method of compensation'' required in these theories.

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Keywords: Theories of distributive justice, Responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, Fleurbaey.

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