Reexamining Edgeworth's “Field of Competition”: Toward Reconstructing the Vision of Competitive Markets
This paper reexamines Francis Ysidro Edgeworth’s concept of “the field of competition” and argues that his theory of markets should be understood not primarily as a precursor to equilibrium theory, but as a theory of competitive movement within an interdependent field of strategic and contractual relations. Although Edgeworth is widely remembered through concepts such as the Edgeworth Box, the contract curve, and the Edgeworth Limit Theorem, these later interpretations have tended to incorporate his work into the framework of general equilibrium theory. In doing so, they have obscured the distinctive way in which Edgeworth understood competition itself. The paper reconstructs Edgeworth’s original perspective by reading Mathematical Psychics (1881) together with “The Pure Theory of Monopoly” (1897; republished in 1925). It shows that these works are unified by a common concern with movement, renegotiation, and instability within what Edgeworth called “the field of competition.” Influenced by nineteenth-century physics, especially the calculus of variations and field-theoretic thinking, Edgeworth conceived market interaction not as the attainment of a fixed equilibrium point, but as a process in which agents continually alter prices, contracts, and strategic positions in response to one another. Competition therefore appears not as a static equilibrium condition, but as an ongoing movement generated by locally changing incentives and interdependent profit conditions. This reinterpretation also clarifies Edgeworth’s relation to the Cournot–Bertrand problem. The paper argues that Edgeworth employed Bertrand’s price competition not simply to replace Cournot’s quantity model, but to criticize the determinacy of equilibrium itself. In the case of duopoly, especially under capacity constraints, firms repeatedly revise prices and contracts, producing cyclical and unstable movements rather than convergence to a unique equilibrium. These movements are interpreted here as expressions of the changing structure of the competitive field. The paper further examines recent discussions of the “Edgeworth paradox,” especially Armstrong and Vickers (2018, 2023), which analyze how costs or taxes may generate unexpected price movements in multiproduct pricing systems. While these studies remain within an equilibrium framework, they nonetheless return to an important Edgeworthian insight: prices move within systems of interdependent strategic reactions rather than independently. The paper argues that these modern analyses indirectly recover the local directional structure of Edgeworth’s competitive field, even though they do not analyze the competitive process itself as an open-ended movement. By reconstructing Edgeworth’s theory from the perspective of field, movement, and recontracting, the paper proposes a reconsideration of the concept of competition in the history of economics. It suggests that Edgeworth offers not merely an incomplete equilibrium theory, but an alternative way of understanding markets as continuously evolving processes of strategic interaction
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Keywords: Edgeworth, Cournot, Bertrand, competition
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