Economists under Pressure and the Political Limits to Economics

Economists and Reciprocal Trade Lawfare in the US and Germany, 1936-40

Meardon Stephen, Bowdoin College

In the late 1930s, United States government officials, including personnel of the US Treasury Department, were preoccupied with the labyrinthine German system of commercial restrictions and privileges. The system was designed to alter the pattern of the trade with the US and its partners for purposes of putting the German economy on a war footing. Provisions of US trade law, including statutes authorizing executive-branch discretion in the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, were designed for purposes of countering certain acts of foreign interference in the pattern of fair or natural trade -- however that was to be interpreted. US Treasury economists and other personnel had the urgent task of determining how to interpret it in the German case. German government economists and other personnel were in the obverse position, observing US actions and crafting German policy with a view to evading the application of punitive US duties. This paper makes use of archival evidence from US Treasury Department personnel and the Bundesarchiv to reveal the character of economists' design, observation, and interpretation of US and German trade law. On the eve of the Second World War, trade policy in both countries was formulated reciprocally and antagonistically.

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Keywords: international trade policy, anti-dumping, countervailing duties, reciprocity

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