Economists under Pressure and the Political Limits to Economics

[YSP] Conceptualizing Common Property Rights: An Institutionalist Reading of Elinor Ostrom

Cervesato Massimo, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

In the face of environmental challenges, the commons have acquired growing importance in studies of natural resource governance. Property rights are central to these analyses, as they shape both our understanding of resource use and our capacity to act upon it (Cox, 2024). Accordingly, several contributions have drawn on Elinor Ostrom’s framework—developed in her Nobel Prize-winning work on commons governance—to rethink prevailing forms of property (Fennell, 2011b; Rose, 2019; Meersman, 2022). Yet, these attempts encounter significant difficulties, whether conceptual or in terms of integration into existing legal systems. A key issue in the analysis of the commons (Fennell, 2011a) lies in the coexistence, across multiple levels, of characteristics typically associated with the public sphere (non-excludability of the resource) and characteristics associated with the private sphere (subtractability of the resource). Moreover, Ostrom’s account is not without limitations, as she never fully develops a precise conceptualization of what common property actually is. While common property is generally understood as allocating ownership to a collective entity rather than to individuals, the nature of this collective remains unclear. Ostrom suggests that common property consists of “essentially share contracts” (Ostrom, 2000: 338). This, however, raises a fundamental question: what distinguishes such a regime from a mere aggregation of individual property rights? To address this, we propose a conceptualization of common property, clarifying this central notion in Ostrom’s commons theory and providing guidance for its legal definition. To do so, we return to the foundations of Ostrom’s framework, which draw on the institutionalist theories of John R. Commons (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). While much of the literature has focused on Ostrom’s use of the Commonsian notion of a ‘bundle of rights’, we argue that further insights can be gained from Commons’s (1924) conception of law in terms of legal correlatives, limits, and reciprocals. Combined with Ostrom’s emphasis on language in interpersonal interactions, this perspective allows us to establish that common property is founded primarily on each member’s recognition of their obligation to respect the individual claims held by all other members, prior to their own. In this sense, common property is an emergent phenomenon arising from the complex relations that constitute the commons, rather than a formal aggregation of distinct private properties. This perspective ultimately highlights the central role of informality in common property regimes, thereby explaining their difficult incorporation into modern legal systems. References: Commons, J.R., 1924. Legal Foundations of Capitalism. New York: The Macmillan Company. Cox, M., 2024. Common Boundaries: The Theory and Practice of Environmental Property. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing. Fennell, L.A., 2011a. Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons. In Research Handbook on the Economics of Property Law, K. Ayotte and H.E. Smith (eds). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 35-56. Fennell, L.A., 2011b. Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons. International Journal of the Commons, 5(1): 9-27. Meersman, J., 2022. Contribution à une théorie juridique des biens communs. PhD thesis, Université Côte d’Azur. Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Ostrom, E., 2000. Private and Common Property Rights. In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. II: Civil Law and Economics, B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 332-379. Rose, C., 2019. Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of Ownership. Abingdon: Routledge. Schlager, E., and Ostrom, E., 1992. Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources. A Conceptual Analysis. Land Economics, 68(3): 249-262.

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Keywords: Common Property Rights; Commons; Ostrom (Elinor); Complexity; Institutionalist Theory

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