Economists under Pressure and the Political Limits to Economics

Objective Hierarchies of Needs, Subjective Preferences, or Partial Hierarchies of Needs and Preferences?

Badiei Sina, University of Strasbourg

Daniel Hausman classifies theories of well-being into three categories: mental-state, objective-list, and preference-satisfaction theories. For almost a century, theoretical economists have predominantly relied on preference-satisfaction theories of well-being (PSTWB), despite their acknowledged limitations. Some positivists, such as Paul Samuelson, found PSTWB attractive because they allowed economics to avoid metaphysical debates. For most welfare economists, however, PSTWB’s appeal lies in their treatment of individual preferences as entirely subjective. As a result, normative approaches in theoretical economics have generally treated the satisfaction of subjective, incommensurable preferences as the principal criterion for evaluating social states and policy choices. This emphasis on subjectivity has drawn strong criticism from ecological economists and objective-list theorists, who call for more objective criteria for assessing human activities, socio-economic structures, and their ecological impacts. Clive Spash, for instance, argues that the dominance of subjective preferences in normative economics impedes constructive engagement with ecological perspectives. Yet, ecological economists such as Ian Gough have engaged deeply with Amartya Sen’s work. Given Sen’s influence on ecological thought and Kenneth Arrow's impact on Sen, it is important to examine whether Arrow and Sen’s writings signify a rupture with, or a continuation of, the subjective-preference-centered tradition. This paper traces the roots of these debates, showing that not only Quesnay and Smith, the founders of modern economics, but even the instigators of the marginalist revolution, such as Menger, viewed most individual actions as motivated by objective hierarchies of needs rather than merely subjective preferences. The paper argues that the rise of the subjective preference paradigm was not a genuinely scientific development but rather a strategic response by Pareto, Mises, and Robbins to socialist and egalitarian economists like Neurath and Pigou. Understanding this shift requires a clear distinction between subjective preferences, methodological individualism, and ordinal utility. Building on this historical analysis, the paper clarifies Arrow and Sen’s complex relationship to Paretian welfare economics. It contends that their principal contribution lies in insisting on the recognition of at least partial similarity among individual preferences. For Sen, this insistence emerges in his work on poverty and equality; for Arrow, it appears early on, in Social Choice and Individual Values. Since the impossibility theorem applies only to situations in which individual rankings stem from entirely subjective preferences, Arrow maintains that a social welfare function can indeed be formed by making the reasonable assumption that, as ultimate ends arise out of biological and cultural needs, they are, in part at least, objective.

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Keywords: Arrow, Sen, welfare economics, ecological economics, social choice theory, basic needs

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