Artifactual Man Meets Rational Fool: Buchanan and Sen on Preference Change, Freedom, and Democracy as “Government by Discussion”
This paper offers a history-of-thought reconstruction of an underappreciated late-1970s convergence between James M. Buchanan and Amartya K. Sen: a shared critique of the standard behavioral model in economics and, in particular, the Stigler–Becker insistence on stable tastes and utility-maximizing agents. The point of entry is archival and contextual: in a 1977 letter to Sen, Buchanan praises Sen’s article “Rational Fools” and urges a “devastating critique of Becker and his disciples,” framing Sen’s argument as a needed challenge to economists’ tendency to extend “useful models” too far. Reading this correspondence alongside Sen’s “Rational Fools” and Buchanan’s “Natural and Artifactual Man” shows that both reject the picture of preference stability and acknowledge evaluative, moral, and self-transformative dimensions of choice: Sen via “commitment” and counter-preferential choice, Buchanan via the “artifactual” capacity for self-creation. Yet the paper also clarifies systematic points of departure. Buchanan’s agent is best understood as a constitutional artisan (agent → structure), prioritizing rule-choice and exchange as the route to expanding opportunity freedom; Sen’s agent is a socially embedded reasoner (agent ⇄ structure), emphasizing public reasoning, the social conditions of reflection, and “process” freedom in addition to opportunity. These contrasts illuminate a deeper issue in liberal political economy: how to respect a subjectivist notion of autonomy while acknowledging that social structures can shape (and sometimes distort) the very capacities for autonomous preference formation. Finally, the paper argues that the “late Buchanan” becomes normatively thicker than commonly presumed. He explicitly acknowledges that “man must be educated” in ethics and political economy in order to be qualified for a liberal society, suggesting that the structure–agency relationship calls for a more active defense of liberal values. This, in turn, complicates the familiar charge that Sen is the more “perfectionist” theorist of autonomy of the two.
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Keywords: Autonomy, Freedom, Preference Change, Public Reasoning
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