Economists under Pressure and the Political Limits to Economics

Where did all the social-democrats go? Economic policy formulation before and during the first González government (1975-19

Luque-Castillo Francisco-Javier, Universidad de Jaén

In his influential work Ruling Ideas: How Global Neoliberalism Goes Local (2016), Cornel Ban posits that the economic policies of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) between 1982 and 1986 constituted a distinct variety of embedded neoliberalism. This hybrid formula emerged from a deliberate reconciliation of core neoliberal tenets with lingering corporatist and social-democratic (Keynesian) principles. Ban attributes the articulation of this synthesis to the strategic ascendancy of two socialist leader –Miguel Boyer and Carlos Solchaga– who had long been involved in epistemic networks revolving around a pivotal intellectual figure: Professor Luis Ángel Rojo. Rojo stands as one of the most influential economists in Spain during the latter half of the twentieth century. He spent a significant part of his career at the Bank of Spain, serving as Director of its Research Service from 1971 to 1988 (Estefanía, 2007, pp.47-48). It was there that he encountered Boyer, a brilliant young economist who had entered the Bank through competitive examination in 1969 (Martín Aceña y Moreno, 1997, p.208). Solchaga, in turn, was recruited by Rojo to teach as an adjunct professor in his university chair (Rodríguez Braun, 1997, p.231). Following the PSOE’s landslide electoral victory in 1982, both men assumed key ministerial portfolios: Economy (Boyer) and Industry (Solchaga). From these positions, they championed and implemented policies inspired by a paradigm developed in the preceding years under Rojo's intellectual leaderdship. Indeed, Ban’s narrative also credits these same figures –Boyer and Solchaga– with incorporating the Keynesian elements of the policy mix, thereby relegating the PSOE's traditional social-democratic faction to a marginal role in the internal decision-making process. However, this account rises some questions. Ban himself acknowledges that an internal party debate persisted at least until March 1983, only being settled in favour of Boyer and Solchaga’s theses following the conspicuous failure of the French Keynesian experiment. Furthermore, while Ban suggests that a concern over the perceived excesses of Keynesianism had been simmering within the social-democratic faction for some time, the process by which this conviction solidified remains insufficiently explained. To address these gaps, this paper proposes a detailed reconstruction of the PSOE’s internal economic debate during a decisive historical juncture: the years spanning from Felipe González’s assumption of the party's general secretariat in 1974 –amidst the oil crisis and the exhaustion of the Francoist economic model– to the end of his first presidential term (1986). This period, marked by the end of the Franco dictatorship, the energy crisis and the legacy of the regime's expansionary economic policies, formed the crucible in which competing projects for a socialist Spain were forged and confronted. To this end, the analysis will first identify the key leaders of the PSOE’s social-democratic wing during this era. It will then examine the specific moments and institutional arenas where the ideological confrontation between this faction and Rojo’s disciples took place. This examination will pay particular attention to how the context of economic crisis and political transition conditioned the available power resources, discursive frameworks, and perceived viability of the competing proposals, thereby offering a more nuanced explanation of the party’s internal evolution.

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Keywords: Neoliberalism, Keynesianism, Francoism, democracy, elites, policies

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