Economists under Pressure and the Political Limits to Economics

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: A Twentieth-Century Genealogy

Lovera Nieto Nestor, Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne
Salles Maurice , Université de Caen-Normandie

The prominence of the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition (IIA) in social choice theory is largely due to its role in Arrow’s impossibility theorem. This condition stipulates that social choice over any given set of alternatives be based solely on preferences concerning those alternatives. The origin of this concept can be traced back to Huntington (1938), a work explicitly cited by Arrow in his seminal book Social Choice and Individual Values (1951). While tracing the origin of a concept is a crucial element of any genealogy, it is equally important to consider the concepts bearing the same name that emerged after the publication of Arrow’s book. These later formulations, which shared the label but differed in meaning, contributed to confusion within the field of social choice. Accordingly, this genealogy of IIA aims both to establish its contemporary origin and to clarify the confusion that has surrounded it. It examines how this confusion arose, why it persisted, and offers a conceptual clarification of the condition. It was only some twenty years after the publication of Arrow’s impossibility theorem that several prominent authors began to examine the examples Arrow used to illustrate violations of IIA—namely, the rank-order voting method and a utilitarian rule based on normalized von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions. Among these authors, Ray (1973) observes that the examples provided by Arrow do not reflect IIA as defined by Arrow himself, but instead correspond to a consistency condition linking choice over a set of alternatives to choice over a subset of that set. This consistency condition appears in the literature on individual choice behavior, particularly within revealed preference theory, and is also present in a two-person context in a paper by Nash (1950). Nash’s condition was later labeled “IIA” by Radner and Marschak (1954). It was not until nearly twenty years later that Bordes and Tideman (1991) revisited this confusion. Unlike Ray and others, they argue that the source of the problem lies in the inadequacy of Arrow’s model to formally articulate a condition of regularity from which the independence condition would follow. Our own hypothesis, however, is that Arrow himself, as well as prominent authors such as Dummett (1984), believed that Nash’s version implied Arrow’s IIA. More recently, Maskin (2024) and Salles (2023) have provided a formal framework that allows the two conditions to be regrouped while preserving the distinction between them.

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Keywords: Independence of irrelevant alternatives; Contraction-consistency; Social choice; Arrow; Nash