Conflict Between Nations or Social Classes? Politics and Economic Theory in the Maastricht Process
The aim of this paper is to analyse the relationship between economic theory and political power in the construction of the Maastricht architecture. We do so by following two distinct, though closely connected, lines of inquiry. The first concerns the shift from the vision of European unification expressed in the Werner Report (1970) to the approach that was eventually adopted and formalised in the Delors Report (1989). In the Werner Report, the creation of a single currency was conceived as a step that should follow the centralisation of fiscal policy and, in this way, bring the process of political unification to its conclusion. By contrast, the Delors Report reversed this sequence. Here, a common currency introduced at the very beginning of the process was expected to function as a catalyst for political unification, rather than as its final outcome. This reversal implied an asymmetric and markedly anti-Keynesian institutional design, selectively inspired in important respects by monetarist principles. Within this architecture, individual states were required to renounce the use of economic policy as an instrument for the pursuit of full employment, without this objective being assumed at the central level. At the same time, the central bank was conceived as primarily oriented towards the preservation of price stability. This u-turn did not occur in a vacuum. These were the years of a double and far-reaching transformation: on the political side, the rise of market-liberal visions associated with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher; on the intellectual side, the return to economic orthodoxy brought about by monetarism, at the expense of the Keynesian framework of the neoclassical synthesis. The parallel global affirmation of market-liberal political visions and monetarist theory, however, is not sufficient to provide a straightforward explanation for the political consensus that formed around the project of a single currency. It is enough to recall the firm opposition of Margaret Thatcher, as well as the criticisms voiced by Milton Friedman. The argument advanced in this paper is that dominant European classes, albeit for different reasons at the national level, converged on the rejection of Keynesian theory and on a politically driven selection within monetarist theory as a way to construct a system that, by placing the defence of international competitiveness at its centre, delegitimised the very possibility of distributive conflict, and, more broadly, imposed a subordinate role on labour in the name of national interest—a condition that persists to this day.
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Keywords: European Monetary Union; Political economy; History of economic thought