Economists under Pressure and the Political Limits to Economics

Harsanyi’s Legacy: Bayesian Games and the Transformation of Microeconomic Theory

Peruzzi Edoardo, Leibniz University Hannover

In a ground-breaking three-part article, “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players”, published in Management Science, John Harsanyi overcame the problem of the infinite hierarchy of beliefs and introduced a very general model to represent games with incomplete information, known as Bayesian games (1967, 1968a, 1968b). In doing so, he substantially broadened the applicability of game theory to economics. By the early 1980s, Bayesian games had become a central analytical tool in microeconomic theory, underpinning models of reputation and entry deterrence in industrial economics, auction theory, mechanism design, and many other areas. Despite Harsanyi’s recognition with the Nobel Prize in 1994, jointly with John Nash and Reinhard Selten, and some discussion in existing scholarship (e.g., Erickson 2019; Fontaine 2010; Giocoli 2009; Igersheim 2022; Myerson 1999), a detailed historical account of how his model of incomplete information was developed remains absent. This article provides such an account, tracing the theoretical, institutional, and personal dimensions of his innovation. Drawing on archival materials from Harsanyi’s papers at the University of California, Berkeley, including correspondence between Harsanyi, Michael Maschler, Robert Aumann, Robert Selten, and Gordon Tullock, together with editorial records from Management Science, I reconstruct how his 1967-68 model took shape. The evidence shows that Harsanyi began thinking about games of incomplete information already in the mid-1950s. His ideas developed gradually, shaped by long exchanges with other scholars and by continued attempts to find a tractable yet sufficiently general mathematical formulation for games with incomplete information. I conclude by identifying two routes through which Harsanyi’s model entered the core of microeconomic theory in the early 1980s. One was a “mathematical” route, pursued by game theorists mostly based in Israel and Belgium, who were primarily interested in the formal foundations of Bayesian games, including repeated games and the development of new solution concepts. The other was an “applied” route, shaped by the institutional setting of U.S. business schools, especially at Northwestern and Stanford, where scholars such as David Kreps, Paul Migrom, and Roger Myerson used Bayesian games to address concrete economic and business problems. References - Erickson, Paul. 2019. The World the Game Theorists Made. University of Chicago Press. - Fontaine, Philippe. 2010. “The Homeless Observer: John Harsanyi on Interpersonal Utility Comparisons and Bargaining, 1950–1964.” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 32 (2): 145–173. - Giocoli, Nicola. 2009. “Three alternative (?) stories on the late 20th-century rise of game theory.” Studi e Note di Economia 14 (2): 187–210. - Harsanyi, John C. 1967. “Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players, I–III Part I. The basic model.” Management Science 14 (3): 159–182. - Harsanyi, John C. 1968a. “Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players part II. Bayesian equilibrium points.” Management Science 14 (5): 320–334. - Harsanyi, John C. 1968b. “Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players part III. The Basic Probability Distribution.” Management Science 14 (7). - Igersheim, Herrade. 2022. “Rawls and the economists: The (im) possible dialogue.” Revue économique 73 (6): 1013–1037. - Myerson, Roger B. 1999. “Nash equilibrium and the history of economic theory.” Journal of Economic Literature 37 (3): 1067–1082.

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Keywords: history of microeconomics, game theory, Bayesian games, incomplete information

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