Public Goods for a Democratic Society
Public expenditures acted as a stopgap to the Great Depression. For the young Richard A. Musgrave, they had to be assessed on their own merit. In the postwar political context, defense expenditures were important to protect American freedom, but international aid should not be sacrificed, and many social needs also cried for Federal government support. Starting with his Harvard PhD dissertation defended in 1937, Musgrave formulated economic reasons for public expenditures, drawing on many traditions in public finance from Adam Smith to Swedish, Italian, and Austrian neoclassical economists of the turn of the twentieth century. Going back to academia in 1948, Musgrave revisited the “magnificent” contribution of Wicksell in order to “re-state” the classical problems of the theory of public finance. Contrary to Buchanan, Musgrave believed that the defining characteristic of social goods was the difficulty in excluding anyone from their enjoyment once they were provided. Samuelson’s watershed paper reframed the problem in the mathematical language of new welfare economics. From an individualistic standpoint, the quantity and the types of what came to be known as public goods funded by governments depended on citizens’ preferences. By analogy with private goods bought in a market, individuals should be willing to pay fees or taxes according to the benefits they receive from public goods. As government expenditures remained front and center of the public economy during the Cold War, it was important to formulate an economic conception of public goods that was convincing to the changing disciplinary landscape in economics. Methodological restrictions embodied in the new welfare economics and the need for economists to maintain a scientific distance from the political fray prevented them from recommending the provision of specific goods. Instead, they assumed that democratic political processes would determine such priorities, which they could take as given inputs in their models. However, in a political forum, economists were blunter. As Musgrave observed after the launch of Sputnik in 1957, “there could have been no setting more dramatically designed to focus on the importance of social wants than that produced by the avalanche of Russian progress bared during recent weeks”. Each in their own way, James Buchanan, Paul Samuelson, and Richard Musgrave thus expanded the field of public finance to explain and justify why some goods should be allocated through political institutions rather than through markets. It helped to draw an economic boundary between the public and the private spheres. Besides coining the modern definition of public goods as non-rival and non-excludable goods, Musgrave positioned them at the heart of the allocation function of the public economy in his Theory of Public Finance, published in 1959.
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Keywords: public goods, Richard Musgrave, Cold War, Paul Samuelson, public expenditures
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