Economists under Pressure and the Political Limits to Economics

Taming Preference Reversal

Lenfant Jean-Sébastien, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Lichtenstein and Slovic’s (1971 ; 1973) identification of a preference reversal phenomenon has been welcomed with both sarcasm and concern in the field of decision theory and behavioral economics. Ever since Grether and Plott’s attempt (1979) to discard the phenomenon as an erroneous intrusion of psychologists into the realm of economists, PR has nourrished a regular flow of interpretations and reinterpretations until the mid-1990s (Slovic, 1995). Our goal, in this article, is to unfold the logic of the arguments and the to make a critical assessment of the disappearance of the preference reversal phenomenon in the theory of choice. Instead of focusing on the apparent consensus that procedural invariance is a fundamental dimension, we aim at questionning the more subversive assumption that single dimension environnments (say monetary incentivized) are too poor to hope discovering peoples’ preferences.

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Keywords: behavioral economics, psychology, Slovic (Paul), Lichtenstein (Sarah), preference reversal