Sleeping Beauties in Economics: Allais, Arrow, and the 75th Anniversary of the 1952 Paris Conference on Risk
The international conference on “Foundations and Applications of the Theory of Risk in Econometrics,” which was held in Paris in May 1952, was a landmark event in the history of decision theory. The meeting represented the high point of a debate on the descriptive and normative validity of expected utility theory and its applications to specific areas of economic analysis, such as general equilibrium theory. Sparked by the novel version of the theory advanced by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944, this debate engaged nearly all major utility theorists of the period from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s. A number of groundbreaking ideas were first aired in the Paris conference: some had an immediate impact on the field, while others remained “sleeping beauties” for a long time and exerted their full influence only much later. The latter include Maurice Allais’s critique of expected utility theory, along with the paradox he introduced to challenge it, and Kenneth Arrow’s approach to state-contingent consumption. Their ideas gained prominence only in the late 1970s, when Allais’s critique and paradox became central to behavioral economics and Arrow’s model served as a foundation of financial economics. This paper opens with a historical reconstruction of the conference on the occasion of its 75th anniversary. It then illustrates the ideas that Allais and Arrow presented at the meeting and traces their trajectories from near neglect to prominence. In both cases, we argue, theoretical and disciplinary contexts were crucial in determining how these intellectual innovations were eventually utilized. Allais’s paradox was initially dismissed as an isolated anomaly and, like other decision-making biases, remained largely overlooked. It drew renewed attention only with the expansion of rational choice theory and the rise of behavioral economics, which introduced an alternative theoretical framework to expected utility theory. Arrow’s model became a classic contribution only after contingent claims analysis was recognized as the most general and parsimonious framework for the findings accumulated in financial economics. A key lesson from this historical revisitation is that, to succeed in twentieth-century economics, these new ideas had to either be incorporated into a broader analytic framework – as in the case of Allais’s paradox and non-expected utility theory – or serve as foundational elements of such a framework – as with Arrow’s model and dynamic asset pricing theory. In both cases, this process took several decades.
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Keywords: Decision-making under risk; Expected utility theory; Maurice Allais; Kenneth Arrow; Allais paradox; State-contingent commodity model
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