Complexity in Hayek: Definitions, Explanations, and Applications to Science
The paper explores F. A. Hayek’s use of the concept of complexity and, especially, the part that it plays in his philosophy of science. Hayek defines complexity in epistemological terms. For Hayek, a complex phenomenon is simply one that cannot be explained or predicted in detail, given the current state of knowledge. Hayek explains complexity, however, in causal (or metaphysical) terms. The reason we cannot explain a phenomenon is typically that its causes are so many (and, often, so convolutedly interrelated, perhaps even feeding back on each other) as to make the phenomenon cognitively intractable. Hayek’s definition leaves open the possibility that some phenomenon, complex, because of our deficient knowledge with respect to it, may become simple with the future advance of knowledge. A phenomenon that we cannot explain and predict today, because our knowledge of the causes from which it emerges is deficient, may be explainable and predictable tomorrow, as our knowledge of its causes improves. Thus, at least implicitly, on Hayek’s view, part of the purpose of science is the conversion of complex into simple phenomena. In the concluding section, I tie this image of science back to a seemingly unrelated argument of Hayek’s in The Sensory Order and, finally, to an argument of Adam Smith’s in The History of Astronomy.
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Keywords: F. A. Hayek, Austrian Economics, complexity, Adam Smith, science
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